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Abstract: Implementing a project, like a nationwide nuclear waste
disposal, which beneﬁts all involved agents but brings major costs only
to the host is often problematic. In practice, revelation issues and re-
distributional concerns are signiﬁcant obstacles to achieving stable agree-
ments. We address these issues by proposing the ﬁrst mechanism to imple-
ment the eﬃcient site (the host with the lowest cost) and share the exact
cost while retaining total control over realized transfers. Our mechanism
is simple and in the vein of the well-known Divide and Choose proce-
dure. The unique Nash equilibrium outcome of our mechanism coincides
with truthtelling, is budget-balanced, individually rational and immune
to coalitional deviations. More generally, our mechanism can also handle
the symmetric case of positive local externalities (e.g., Olympic Games)
and even more complex situations where the usefulness of the project
regardless of its locationis not unanimous.
Keywords: Public goods; local externalities; NIMBY; implementa-
tion; mechanism design; VCG mechanisms.
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1 Introduction
The search for hazardous waste landﬁlls and nuclear waste repositories in the United
States and in many other countries has proven to be a diﬃcult task. Even when oﬀered
monetary compensation, very few communities have accepted to host such facilities.
Since the mid-70s only one small radioactive waste disposal facility and a single
hazardous waste landﬁll (ﬁttingly located in Last Chance, Colorado) have been sited
in the United States (see Gerrard, 1994). Consequently, the U.S. nuclear industry still
faces a major problem. Several other similar programs face social rejection from local
populations: noxious facilities, prisons, airports, etc. These public goods are socially
necessary but come with local externalities (noise, pollution, noxious odors, etc.) or
bear a negative connotation. Diﬀerent factors can generate such rejection: the loss
in the economic value of property, the loss in the perceived quality of life or the fear
of health hazards, etc. In economic terms, these public goods have a private-bad
aspect to them which creates a siting problem (the so-called "NIMBY" problem, for
"Not In My Backyard"): all communities beneﬁt from the project but only onethe
hostbears the cost.
Similarly, choosing a host for a project which generates desirable local externali-
ties, such as a major international research project (like the International Thermonu-
clear Experimental Reactor, ITER) or a major sporting event (the Olympic Games),
is no easier task to accomplish. Here, beneﬁts accrue to all (as in the "local bad" case)
but the host obtains an additional localized surplus. Consequently, all communities
compete to be the host. The selection process is then a long and costly one where
each participant tries to prove that it is the best candidate.
For the sake of exposition, we consider the case of a project generating negative
externalities throughout the body of the paper and postpone the issue of hosting a
locally desirable project until the Appendix. The overall cost of the project being
tied to the identity of the host, eﬃciency asks that the host be the community with
the lowest hosting cost. In practice, a diﬃculty one faces when implementing such
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a project is that the planner typically has access to much less information than the
involved parties, which causes a revelation problem. Secondly, even when the ef-
ﬁcient host is identiﬁed, there still could exist strong opposition (from the host or
other participants) preventing the eﬃcient outcome from occurring. As pointed out
in Easterling (1992) and Frey et al. (1996), the structure of the compensation itself
could result in the rejection of the project. Therefore, it is crucial that the planner
be able to select a speciﬁc sharing outcome, which may take into account the vol-
untary participation of involved communities (no community should pay more than
the beneﬁts it derives from the project), their budget constraints, the relative size
of their population, their respective involvement in the project or any other relevant
characteristic. Taking into account such redistribution issues helps ease the siting
process itself and reinforces the stability of the agreement. Unfortunately, no existing
mechanism can handle the revelation and redistributional aspects simultaneously.
Our main contribution is to propose a simple mechanism which gives the planner
control over cost shares while not sacriﬁcing eﬃciency. Our mechanism is in the vein
of the well-known Divide and Choose procedure and does not rely on "doomsday"
threats: communities jointly propose a monetary compensation for the host, which
any community can acceptthus becoming the hostor reject. If no community
accepts the compensation, the most fervent proponent of the project is selected to be
the host instead.
A well-known class of outcome-eﬃcient mechanisms is that of Vickrey-Clark-
Groves (VCG) mechanisms. Announcing one's true cost is a dominant strategy (thus,
the eﬃcient outcome is chosen) but these mechanisms fail to balance the budget and
generate a surplus which cannot be redistributed between the agents while preserving
the strategic properties of the method (see Moulin, 2007, Section 4, for a VCG treat-
ment of the NIMBY problem). In fact, it is a well-known fact that an eﬃcient and
budget-balanced outcome cannot be implemented in dominant strategy1i.e., where
1See Green and Laﬀont, 1979.
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agents need only know their own characteristics to behave optimallyfor direct rev-
elation mechanisms. Hence, one must impose some informational structure.
One way out of the eﬃciency/incentive compatibility trade-oﬀ is to allow the so-
cial planner to use statistical information about agents' valuations and to replace
dominant strategy equilibrium by Bayesian incentive compatibility. D'Aspremont
and Gerard-Varet, 1979, elaborate a mechanism which is Bayesian incentive compat-
ible, eﬃcient, and budget-balanced. However, individual rationality is not satisﬁed.
Mailath and Postlewaite, 1990, show that if individual rationality is required along
with Bayesian incentive compatibility, then it is generally impossible to achieve ef-
ﬁciency. Moreover, they show that as the number of involved agents grows, the
probability of undertaking the eﬃcient project goes to zero.
For the problem at hand, O'Sullivan (1993) investigates Bayesian-Nash equilib-
rium behavior under a sealed-bid auction where the community submitting the lowest
bid hosts the project and receives the highest bid as compensation (thus failing to bal-
ance the budget). In the same vein, Minehart and Neeman (2002) propose a method
adapted from a second-price auction: the host is the community with the lowest cost
or, if not (compensation induces misrepresentation of costs), the authors argue that
the eﬃciency loss is small when the number of agents is large. The procedure is self-
ﬁnanced but the host obtains an arbitrary surplus because it is compensated with the
second lowest bid, as in a second-price auction.
Given the likely nature of the applicationthe siting of a single large and long-
lived facility between a handful of neighboring communitieswe opted for a diﬀerent
informational context where agents have speciﬁc information on others' characteris-
tics. The restrictiveness of our analysis, and of the non-Bayesian implementation lit-
erature in general, is in terms of information held (or acquired) by agents: agents must
have some information about the preference proﬁle. This is the price to pay for deal-
ing with "universal" mechanisms which do not use any statistical information about
the distribution of agents' characteristics. Part of the literature on non-cooperative
5
implementation under complete information has produced general characterization
theorems (see Peleg, 1978, Maskin, 1999, or Jackson, 2001, for a survey). The re-
sulting mechanisms are very abstract and so general that they often cannot take into
account speciﬁc restrictions on preferences or speciﬁc environments and, thus, are of
little help for the siting problem at hand in practice.
Another strand of the literature on non-Bayesian implementation takes advantage
of the structure of speciﬁc environments in order to produce simpler mechanisms.
For the problem at hand, Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) require that agents be
fully informed about the preference proﬁle and design a mechanism which leads to
eﬃcient siting with budget-balanced transfers2. However, their mechanism does not
allow for any control over transfer payments. In fact,while their mechanism allows
for much ﬂexibility in sharing the surplus between the aggregate bid and the hosting
cost, this ﬂexibility does not apply to the actual hosting cost as the surplus is always
equal to zero in equilibrium. By contrast, our mechanism allows for the Nash imple-
mentation of any individually rational division of the whole hosting cost. Moreover,
our mechanism only requires that communities know which community has the lowest
hosting cost and not the whole cost proﬁle. We assume that the planner has no infor-
mation on the cost proﬁle. We show that the unique Nash equilibrium outcome of our
mechanism coincides with truth-telling (the host's true cost is revealed). Moreover,
the host chosen in equilibrium is an eﬃcient one whenever carrying out the project
turns out to be eﬃcient, the outcome is budget-balanced, individually rational and
the planner has total control over realized transfers.
Regarding the issue of accurately allocating costs in a non-Bayesian context, Jack-
son and Moulin (1992) jointly handle a revelation problem and redistribution concerns
for the traditional case of a pure public good. As such, their mechanism considers only
one possible project and therefore cannot address the issue of host selection which is
2Ehlers (2007) considers a variant of Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein's mechanism. He shows that
his natural interpretation puts severe restrictions on the existence of Nash equilibria. In particular,
no equilibrium exists when only one project is eﬃcient.
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central here. Moreover, while the non-Bayesian informational context is crucial for
our results to hold, it should be pointed out that, even in perfect information, second
price auctions à la Minehart & Neeman (2002) would admit a continuum of equilib-
ria between the lowest and the second lowest hosting cost, thus preventing precise
redistribution of costs.
The mechanism we propose proceeds in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, each com-
munity announces the lowest hosting cost (the community announcing the lowest
such cost will be referred to as the "optimist"). In the second stage, each commu-
nity other than the "optimist" announces its own cost of hosting the project. The
host is then selected among those communities which announce the lowest cost in
the second stage, provided it accepts the compensation announced by the optimist.
If not, the optimist becomes the host. This Divide and Choose structure guarantees
truthful revelation from the optimist: the optimist does not want to overstate the
eﬃcient cost because her cost share depends on it. But also, reporting a too low
value puts her at risk of becoming the host. Contrasting with Perez-Castrillo and
Wettstein (2002), whose one-stage game is unable to implement pre-determined cost
shares, our two-stage structure is essential to allow the planner to have control over
transfer payments.
The siting problem is related to the framework of King Solomon's dilemma where
a single indivisible prize must be awarded to one of several agents. The prize must
be allocated to the agent which values it the most at no cost for him. Glazer and Ma
(1989) implements that outcome in subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium by assuming
perfect information among the agents. The mechanism developed in Perez-Castrillo
and Wettstein (2002) also implements the eﬃcient outcome by assuming perfect infor-
mation. Perry and Reny (1999) relax the perfect information assumption by assuming
that all agents know only who values the prize the most. They provide a mechanism
which achieves the desired outcome in iteratively weakly dominated strategies. Com-
paratively, our mechanism would realize an eﬃcient outcome in unique Nash equilib-
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rium outcome with the same information structure. However, as in Perez-Castrillo
and Wettstein (2002) our mechanism would impose a monetary cost on the winner
but, due to the fact that we allow for total control over transfer payments, this cost
could be mitigated.
In addition to being able to handle King Solomon's dilemma and the symmetric
counterpart to the NIMBY problem, where beneﬁts accrue to all and the host ob-
tains an additional beneﬁt (e.g., as in the case of hosting the Olympic Games), our
mechanism can be used to handle a much larger class of situations. For instance,
certain categories of people may obtain negative beneﬁts if a given project is carried
out, independently of where it is sited (e.g., some communities may frown upon the
use of nuclear energy in general). Our mechanism allows for these communities to be
compensated by those in favor of the project.
2 The Model
Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of communities, with n ≥ 2. Each community i = 1, ..., n
obtains a beneﬁt, bi ∈ R, if the project is carried outregardless of its location
and incurs a cost, ci ∈ R+, if it is selected to host the project3. We take the view
that ci encompasses the actual construction cost of the project plus the disutility of
community i from hosting the project, both of which are localized and community-
speciﬁc. Let b = (bi)i²N be the proﬁle of beneﬁts and c = (ci)i²N be the cost proﬁle.
Without loss of generality we rank communities from lowest to highest hosting cost:
c1 ≤ c2 ≤ .... ≤ cn. The proﬁle of beneﬁts is known to the planner4. The cost proﬁle
is unknown to the planner but it is common knowledge that each community i knows
c1 and its own ci. The total payoﬀ of community i if the project is carried out is given
3For clarity, we use a beneﬁt interpretation for the bi's, but these parameters can be negative for
some communities, indicating that they are against the project altogether.
4Note that, if the proﬁle of beneﬁts is not immediately accessible to the planner, one could readily
embed the mechanism proposed in Jackson and Moulin (1992) in ours to elicit this proﬁle as well.
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by:
ui = bi − I(i = host)ci − ti (1)
where ti are transfers paid by community i and I(i = host) is the indicator function
equal to 1 if i is the host and 0 otherwise. Eﬃciency requires the good to be built
if
∑
N bi ≥ c1 and hosted by a community h such that ch = c1. If
∑
N bi < c1, the
project should not be built.
We design a mechanism which selects a host community and assigns cost-shares
αi(θ)ch to each community i5, where θ represents a number of exogenous (and known
to the planner) characteristics relevant for sharing the cost6 and where
∑
N αi(θ) = 1.
We view it as the planner's responsibility to ensure that the sharing method induces
individual rationality (i.e., bi−αi(θ)c1 ≥ 0 for all i). Many well-known rules meeting
such a requirement exist (see, e.g., Moulin, 2002). In particular, in a companion paper
(Laurent-Lucchetti and Leroux, 2009), we discuss the appealing properties of Lindahl
prices in this context (αi ≡ biP
N bj
). Note that αi can be either positive or negative,
making it possible to compensate communities which are wholeheartedly against the
project regardless of its location (i.e. bi < 0).
5The careful reader will notice that we slightly abuse notation because the communities are
indexed in increasing order of ci's, which is unknown to the planner. In fact, the cost shares are
attached to the agents names. In other words, the planner announces a vector of αpi(i)(θ)'s, where
pi : N → N is the (unknown) permutation from the agents' cost ranks to their names. The same
notational shortcut applies to the vector of beneﬁts.
6It will be clear from the proof of our results, that if the planner wishes to include the cost proﬁle
c in α, αi(.) must be non-decreasing in ci to maintain the strategic properties of the procedure. If
the planner wishes the outcome of the mechanism to also be immune to coalitional deviations, then
αi(.) should not depend on the costs of other communities, c−i.
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3 The Mechanism
Our mechanism proceeds in two stages after the planner announces the value of
∑
N bi.
Stage 1: Each community is asked to announce the lowest hosting cost in the
proﬁle, we denote by ci agent i's announcement. Deﬁne c = min(ci). The com-
munity which announces c will be referred to as community i∗ (the "optimist"). If
there are more than one "optimist" then any tie-breaking rule can be applied to select
i∗. If
∑
N bi ≥ c, proceed to Stage 2, otherwise stop and the project is not carried out.
Stage 2: Each community other than i∗ is asked to announce its own hosting
cost: γi. Deﬁne γh = mini6=i∗(γi). The host community ("h") will be randomly
chosen among those announcing γh.
If
∑
N bi ≥ min γj, the following transfers are implemented: th = −c+ αh(θ)cti = αi(θ)c for i 6= h
If
∑
N bi < min γj, the optimist becomes the host (h = i∗) and the above transfers
are carried out.
The intuition is very simple: communities jointly propose a monetary compensa-
tion for the host, c, which any community can accept by announcing the lowest γi of
allthus becoming the hostor reject by announcing a large γi. If no community
accepts the compensation (i.e., if min γj >
∑
N bi), the most fervent proponent of
the project (the "optimist") is selected to be the host instead. As we shall see, this
Divide and Choose structure guarantees truthful revelation from the optimist.
10
Note that if the project is carried out the payoﬀs of communities are: uh = bh − αh(θ)c+ (c− ch)ui = bi − αi(θ)c for i 6= h
Theorem 1. The unique Nash equilibrium outcome of the mechanism coincides with
truthful revelation, γh = c = c1, whenever it is eﬃcient to carry out the project.
Otherwise the project is not carried out. The outcome is eﬃcient, budget-balanced
and individually rational.
Proof. We show the existence of an equilibrium by determining best response strate-
gies for all agents i 6= i∗ in Stage 2, and show that, given these best responses, all
agents announce ci = c1 in Stage 1.
Stage 2 : Best responses for i 6= i∗
• If c > ci: Announce γi = 0 (so as to maximize her chances of becoming the
host).
• If c < ci: Announce γi =
∑
N bj + ² (or anything higher so as to be sure not to
become the host).
• If c = ci: Becoming the host or not is payoﬀ equivalent. Agent i can do no
better than by announcing γi = ci.
Stage 1 :
Best responses for i given the above best responses in Stage 2:
• If minj 6=i cj > c1: Announce ci = c1, in order to become the optimist and pay a
lower cost share (recall that c = minj cj becomes the cost in Stage 2).
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• If minj 6=i cj < c1: Announce ci = c1, in order to not become the optimist and,
in turn, avoid becoming the host.
• If minj 6=i cj = c1: Agent i can do no better than announcing ci = c1.
We now show the uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium outcome by establishing
that in any Nash equilibrium c = c1 = ch:
Step 1 : c = c1
• Suppose a Nash equilibrium existed where c > c1. Then i 6= h could obtain a
lower cost share by announcing a lower ci in Stage 1 so as to lower c and, in
turn, her cost share. Thus, c > c1 cannot be part of a Nash equilibrium of the
mechanism.
• Suppose a Nash equilibrium existed where c < c1.
a) If i∗ = h (because minN γi >
∑
N bi): i∗ could obtain a higher payoﬀ by
announcing a higher ci in Stage 1 so as to obtain a higher compensation or to
no longer be the optimist.
b) If i∗ 6= h: h could obtain a higher payoﬀ by announcing γh =
∑
N bj + ²
so as to no longer be the host.
Thus, c < c1 cannot be part of a Nash equilibrium of the mechanism.
Step 2 : ch = c = c1
• Suppose a Nash equilibrium existed where ch > c = c1. Then, h could obtain a
higher payoﬀ by announcing γh =
∑
N bj + ² so as to no longer be the host.
Thus, ch > c = c1 cannot be part of a Nash equilibrium of the mechanism.
Hence, because ch ≥ c1 (with our notation), it must be that ch = c = c1.
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Hence, the unique Nash equilibrium outcome exists and coincides with truth-
telling7: whenever it is eﬃcient to build, the project is carried out, the host is an
eﬃcient one, and the cost to be shared is the true cost. An important concern re-
garding the selection of an eﬃcient outcome is its robustness to coalitional deviations,
especially in a context of possible proximity of agents (e.g., neighboring communi-
ties) which is consistent with our informational structure. It turns out that the unique
Nash equilibrium outcome of our mechanism is also immune to coalitional deviations.
Theorem 2. The unique Nash equilibrium outcome of the mechanism is immune to
coalitional deviations.
Proof. We denote by ∆x the variation of a variable x; recall that b, θ and α are
exogenously given. Denote by S ⊆ N a deviating coalition.
• Step 1: The grand coalition: S = N
The unique SPNE outcome of our mechanism is eﬃcient: the host is one of the
communities with the lowest cost, which maximizes the sum of all payoﬀs. Thus,
the grand coalition cannot increase its aggregate payoﬀ by a joint deviation.
• Step 2: h ∈ S.
Consider the joint payoﬀ:
∑
S
ui(γh, c) =
∑
S
bi −
∑
S
αi(θ)c+ (c− ch)
A positive variation in γh (so that h is still the host) does not change the joint
payoﬀ. If γh + ∆γh > minj 6=h γj, roles changes (h "becomes" an agent i) and
7Note that throughout the proof, knowledge of the identity per se of the host is not required, only
his cost. However, situations where agents only know the hosting cost but not the host's identity
seem unlikely in practice.
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the joint payoﬀ does not change (recall that c = ch in equilibrium). A negative
variation in γh does not change the joint payoﬀ either.
A negative variation in c decreases the coalition payoﬀ by (1−∑S αi(θ))|∆c| >
0. A positive variation is impossible given the best responses: all other commu-
nities announce ci = c1 in the ﬁrst stage.
Coordinated deviations from c and γh: if the variations are in opposite directions
(positive for γh and negative for c) or both negative the payoﬀ decreases in either
case by (1−∑S αi(θ))|∆c| ≥ 0.
Thus,
∑
S ui(γh, c) ≥
∑
S ui(γh +∆γh, c+∆c) for any admissible values of ∆c
and ∆γh.
• Step 3: h /∈ S.
Deviations not including h cannot be proﬁtable for the member of S because
the only payoﬀ-altering deviation would be to announce a lower c in Stage 1 or
a lower γi6=h in Stage 2. These deviations are ineﬃcient ones where an agent in
S becomes the host, which cannot increase the aggregate payoﬀ of coalition S.
4 Conclusion
We developed a simple and general mechanism in the same vein as the Divide and
Choose procedure to select a host for a project generating local externalities. To the
best of our knowledge, our mechanism is the ﬁrst to select an eﬃcient site and imple-
ment any individually rational redistribution scheme. It is simple and its unique Nash
equilibrium outcome coincides with truth-telling, is eﬃcient, budget-balanced and
immune to coalitional deviations. Regarding the informational structure, it requires
that each community knows the community with the lowest cost. This assumption,
while restrictive, reasonably approximates environments where the involved agents
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have much more information about their respective characteristics than the planner
(i.e., communities in a given region are typically better informed about their mu-
tual characteristics than the federal state). Moreover, our mechanism can even be
used to handle cases where communities disagree about the usefulness of the project
(regardless of its location).
In a companion paper, Laurent-Lucchetti and Leroux (2009) propose a speciﬁc
distribution of costs, αi(.), based on normative considerations. At the heart of the
argument is the mitigation of the physical asymmetry of the siting problem: the fact
that the cost incurred by a single community (the host) determines the cost to be
shared by all. This approach characterizes a unique sharing rule which turns out to
be Lindahl Pricing.
Our model could be extended by allowing for the disutility of other communities
than the host to be positive (e.g., the neighbors of the host could also suﬀer a local
disutility). We chose not to address this possibility in the present model, implying that
communities are deﬁned in a wide enough sense so that the externalities generated
by the project stay contained in it. Nonetheless, the question is an interesting one,
which we leave for further research.
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A Appendix: The case of local positive externality
The model is identical to that in the body of the paper except that net hosting costs
can be negative: ci ∈ R− for all i. Implicitly, a negative cost amounts to assuming that
the host of the project enjoys a localized beneﬁt which is larger than the construction
cost.
Our mechanism must be modiﬁed as follows: in Stage 2 the γ's are restricted to
be no less than M , a number ﬁxed by the planner between stages such that M < c.
The purpose of M is to prevent bidding wars ad inﬁnitum in Stage 2 should the
surplus announced by the optimist be too low (note that this is an oﬀ-equilibrium
consideration). In fact, this version of the mechanism can be applied to ci ∈ R+
as well (actually, no restrictions are needed on the ci's) but we chose to present the
simpler version in the body of the paper for the sake of exposition.
Theorem 3. The unique Nash equilibrium outcome of the mechanism coincides with
truthful revelation, γh = c = c1, whenever it is eﬃcient to carry out the project.
Otherwise the project is not carried out. The outcome is eﬃcient, budget-balanced
and individually rational.
Proof. We show the existence of an equilibrium by determining best response strate-
gies for all agents i 6= i∗ in Stage 2, and show that, given these best responses, all
agents announce ci = c1 in Stage 1.
Stage 2 : Best responses for i 6= i∗
• Case 1: if c > ci: Announce γi =M (so as to maximize her chances of becoming
the host).
• Case 2: if c < ci: Announce γi >
∑
N bi (so as to be sure not to become the
host).
• Case 3: if c = ci: Becoming the host or not is payoﬀ equivalent. Agent i can do
no better than to announce γi = ci.
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Stage 1 :
Best responses for i:
• If minj 6=i cj > c1: Announce ci = c1, in order to become the optimist and obtain
a higher share of the surplus (recall that c = minj cj becomes the surplus to be
shared in Stage 2).
• If minj 6=i cj < c1: Announce ci = c1, in order to not become the optimist and,
in turn, avoid becoming the host given the best response proﬁle in Stage 2.
• If minj 6=i cj = c1: Agent i can do no better than announcing ci = c1 given the
best response proﬁle in Stage 2.
We now show the uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium outcome by establishing
that in any Nash equilibrium c = c1 = ch:
Step 1 : c = c1
• Suppose a Nash equilibrium existed where c > c1. Then i 6= h could obtain a
higher payoﬀ by announcing a lower ci in Stage 1 so as to lower c. Thus, c > c1
cannot be part of a Nash equilibrium of the mechanism.
• Suppose a Nash equilibrium existed where c < c1.
a) If i∗ = h (because minN γi >
∑
N bi): i∗ could obtain a higher payoﬀ by
announcing a higher ci in Stage 1 so as to redistribute a lower surplus or to no
longer be the optimist.
b) If i∗ 6= h: h could obtain a higher payoﬀ by announcing γh >
∑
N bi so
as to no longer be the host.
Thus, c < c1 cannot be part of a Nash equilibrium of the mechanism.
Step 2 : ch = c = c1
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• Suppose a Nash equilibrium existed where ch > c = c1. Then, h could obtain a
higher payoﬀ by announcing γh >
∑
N bi so as to no longer be the host.
Thus, ch > c = c1 cannot be part of a Nash equilibrium of the mechanism.
Hence, because ch ≥ c1 (with our notation), it must be that ch = c = c1.
Theorem 4. The unique Nash equilibrium outcome of the mechanism is immune to
coalitional deviations.
Proof. Follows directly from the proof of Theorem 2.
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